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Environmentalists often urge their home countries to take a leading role in reducing 
global environmental problems like climate change. A pertinent question is: will 
examples set by leading nations influence others to follow suit, and if so, do the costs of 
leading matter? For instance, will costly domestic reductions have a stronger effect on 
followers than purchases of cheap emission permits abroad? To investigate these 
questions we have conducted two treatments in a public bad experiment in which 
leaders have different costs of leading. Our findings suggest that higher costs of leading 
lead to stronger effects of a given leader example. Randomly chosen leaders lead by 
example and set better examples if it is less costly to do so. Finally, there seems to be a 
limit to the leader effect and it may decrease over time. 
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1. Introduction 
Global commons problems like climate change require some sort of cooperation to 
avoid inefficient and undesirable outcomes. This is suggested by theory, empirical 
evidence, and laboratory experiments of common pool resource games and public bad 
games (see e.g., Ostrom et al. 1992, Ostrom 1994, Vyrastekova and van Soest 2003). 
Since the costs of inefficient management could be very large, it is important to 
investigate mechanisms that could lead to increased voluntary cooperation in the first 
place and to the establishment of treaties in the second place.  
 
One possible mechanism to improve group cooperation in social dilemmas could be the 
appointment of a group „leader‟ (Messick and Brewer 1983). Yet, empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of leadership as a means to stimulate cooperation is scarce, and 
most studies use data collected in laboratory experiments. For example, experiments in 
the social psychological literature have identified several types, styles, and aspects of 
leadership that affect cooperation, including group identification (Van Vugt and De 
Cremer 1999), group stability (Van Vugt et al. 2004), feelings of entitlement (De 
Cremer and van Dijk 2005), leader fairness (Wit and Wilke 1988), leader election (van 
Dijk et al. 2003), and preference for leadership (Messick et al. 1983). Economic 
experiments thus far have mainly focused on one of the simplest possible forms of 
leadership, leading by example. Leading by example in social dilemmas refers to a 
setting in which leaders are first movers but have no formal authority; the only thing 
they can do is to set a good example, for instance by cutting back their usage of the 
common resource, and to make this known to other group members, hoping that their 
good examples inspire followers to take similar actions. Conclusions from these 
experiments are somewhat ambiguous. For instance, Güth et al. (2007) report that 
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installing a leader leads to significantly higher levels of cooperation (which we will call 
the leadership effect) in a public good game whereas Gächter and Renner (2003) find 
no significant difference between treatments with and without a leader. In a public bad 
setting, Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003) observe a positive effect of leadership. In 
that study, however, leaders were confederates who were instructed to set very good 
examples. 
 
Most of these leadership experiments have been symmetric, apart from the order of 
moves.
1
 Typically, it is assumed that the costs and benefits of cooperative actions are 
the same for all players, which may not always be the case in the real world. The 
starting point and the novel feature of our paper is that leaders and followers may differ. 
In particular, we introduce a difference in costs, i.e. the costs of making a cooperative 
choice are or are not the same for leaders and followers, depending on the treatment. 
This type of asymmetry enables us to address the issue whether the costs of leadership 
are important for cooperation in a social dilemma situation. This question is for instance 
relevant when leading nations have to choose between costly reductions in domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions and purchases of cheap emission permits abroad. If the costs 
of leading matter for the hypothesized leadership effect, a nation may provoke more 
global emission reduction per unit cost of abatement by costly domestic reductions than 
by low cost purchases of permits abroad.  
 
The answer to the question about the effect of costs is not clear a priori. Two opposing 
factors may be present. On the one hand, leaders could be expected to set better 
examples, e.g., make lower investments in the public bad if it is less costly for them to 
do so.
2
 On the other hand, followers may be less inclined to follow a leader when they 
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know that setting a good example is not very costly for the leader. Our design allows us 
to test both these intuitions and to examine the relative strengths of these factors.      
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
public bad experiment. The experimental design has two treatments: high and low costs 
of leading. Section 3 presents results and analyzes data; section 4 concludes. We find 
that regardless of costs, randomly chosen leaders tend to set good examples, with the 
best examples set for low costs. Higher costs of leading lead to stronger leadership 
effects.  The leadership effect may reflect both the leadership institution and the 
goodness of the example set. The effect has its limitations and is reduced over time.  
 
2. Experiment and procedures 
We present the game, theoretical predictions, and procedures. 
 
2.1. A public bad game with a leader 
The social dilemma situation we consider is characterized by a conflict between an 
individual‟s interest and the common interest. One could for instance think about a 
global environmental problem like climate change, where there is a conflict between an 
agent‟s or individual country‟s interest to pollute and the broader, social interest of the 
collective to reduce pollution.  In order to mimic such a persistent environmental 
problem, which usually requires numerous policy initiatives, we use a public bad 
experiment with multiple rounds and a partner design (Andreoni 1988), i.e. the 
composition of the groups remains the same over all rounds.  
 
The experimental design is a slight variation on a standard simultaneous public bad 
game (see e.g. Andreoni 1995), which we call a public bad game with a leader. In this 
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game, not all subjects make their investment decisions simultaneously but one subject 
moves first (Moxnes and van der Heijden 2003). That is, one group member is 
randomly selected to be the leader (for all rounds to be played) and this leader first 
decides how much to invest in the public bad. The other group members (the followers) 
are informed about the leader‟s investment and then choose their investments 
individually and simultaneously. We have run two treatments of the public bad game 
with a leader. In both treatments subjects play in fixed groups of five, and in each round 
subjects are endowed with 20 tokens, which they allocate between two projects: project 
A (the public bad) and project B.  
 
In the basic leader treatment, the return on the two projects is the same for leaders and 
followers. For all subjects, investing in project A (B) gives a direct private return of 0.7 
(0.4) per token invested. Besides, project A has a negative external effect: each token 
invested in this project yields a negative return of 0.1 to all group members. So, payoff 
i  to individual i (i=1, 2, ..., 5) when she or he invests x i
A
 in project A and x i
B
 in 













ii xxx        (1) 
where x j
A
 denotes the investment in project A (the public bad) by subject j (j=1, 2, ..., 
5), and x xi
A
i









ii xx 1.02.00.8        (2) 
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Because in this treatment leaders and followers have the same costs of investing in 
project B and the same pay-off function we call it the Same-Leader-Cost treatment or 
SLC. 
 
To test for effects of different leader costs, we have introduced a second leader 
treatment, the No-Leader-Cost treatment or NLC. The only distinction from treatment  
SLC is that only for the leader the return on project B is increased from 0.4 (as in 
















     (3) 
whereas follower payoffs are still given by (1). From equation (3) one can see that in 
treatment NLC leaders have no costs of acting socially and that the leaders‟ payoffs 
only depend on
A
jx , the investments of others. It is important to note that even though 
the leaders‟ own contribution levels do not affect their payoffs, it is not true that leaders 
always have higher payoffs than followers in this treatment. For example, if the leader 
and all followers invest 20, there is no investment in project B and the leader has no 
advantage over the followers. Starting in this position, any reduction in investment in 
project A that the leader makes will only benefit the followers and hence make them 
better off than the leader. If all followers invest 15, followers will be better off than the 
leader for leader investments below 5 tokens.   
 
In the experiment, it was common knowledge among all subjects that the payoff 
functions for the leader and the followers were the same in treatment SLC and different 
in treatment NLC.  Finally, note that in our experiment the same subject has the leader 
role over all rounds reflecting that roles are likely to change only slowly. This mimics a 
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situation in which leadership is seen as a persistent phenomenon, as it usually is in our 
view. Alternatively, the leader‟s role may rotate. Güth et al. (2007) have compared 
fixed and rotating leadership in a public good experiment and found no significant 
difference between the two institutions. For recent experimental studies on endogenous 
leadership, see Arbak and Villeval (2007) and Bruttel and Fischbacher (2010).  
 
2.2. Theoretical predictions 
In the one-shot version of treatment SLC purely selfish, money-maximizing followers 
have a dominant strategy to invest their total endowment in the public bad, irrespective 
of the leader‟s investment. A backward induction argument then implies an investment 
of 20 in the public bad for a selfish and rational leader as well. Hence, the unique Nash 
equilibrium is x i
A
 = 20 for all group members i, with a total investment of 100 tokens in 
project A and individual payoff ofi = 4 i.  The socially optimal outcome is obtained 
by full cooperation, however. If all members of a group invested the total endowment in 
project B, i.e. x i
A
= 0 for all group members i, the payoff to each player would double, 
i =8 i. In case of multiple rounds the Nash prediction for the last round is the same as 
in the one-shot version and therefore, by backward induction, for all previous rounds as 
well.  
 
The theoretical prediction for treatment NLC is less clear. Selfish and rational followers 
are still expected to invest 20 in the public bad. However, selfish leaders would be 
indifferent and no unique hypothesis for the investment by leaders in treatment NLC 
can be identified. The only option leaders have to affect their own payoffs is to 
somehow influence followers to invest less in project A. Because setting a good 
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example is not directly costly in treatment NLC one could hypothesize that leaders in 
this treatment would invest less in the public bad than in treatment SLC.  
 
Numerous experiments have shown, though, that people do not always behave in a 
selfish and rational way. They may for instance also partly be motivated by other-
regarding preferences. In addition, findings from some of the economic experiments 
mentioned in the introduction suggest that leaders often set a good example
3
 and that 
followers have a tendency to follow their leaders. If leader investments in the public 
bad are lower in treatment NLC than in treatment SLC one could hypothesize that 
followers will invest less in treatment NLC as well.   
 
However, the latter hypothesis needs to be tested empirically because of a counter 
argument. Followers may appreciate the good examples set by the leader in treatment 
NLC less because they know the leader does not have to make a sacrifice. The 
behavioral reaction of followers may thus be that in treatment NLC they are less 
inclined to follow their leader than in treatment SLC where it is costly to lead by 
example. This implies that although leaders can be expected to set better examples in 
treatment NLC, followers‟ reactions in response to a given example may be weaker. It 
is unclear ex ante which effect will dominate.  
 
In Appendix 1 this somewhat loose intuition is supported by a more formal analysis 
under the assumption of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, and Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000). We show that in treatment SLC followers should be more sensitive to 
the leader‟s example than in treatment NLC. Under certain conditions an equilibrium 
with all subjects investing zero in the public bad can be sustained in treatment SLC. 
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Inequality aversion may be an explanation for some of the leadership effects found in 
previous economic experiments and our design offers further possibilities to examine 
inequality aversion because of the asymmetry in costs. For treatment NLC, Appendix 1 
shows that an equilibrium where all invest zero cannot be sustained. Furthermore, we 
show that even though setting the best example is not directly costly for leaders in 
treatment NLC, they may not do so if they are inequality averse and anticipate 
followers‟ reactions. 
 
In addition to examining effects of costs, our experiment may give indications about 
saturation of the leadership effect as a function of example set (nonlinearity) and about 
the development of the effect over time. It will also help distinguish effects of the 
leadership institution and the size of the example set by leaders. 
 
2.3. The experimental procedure 
Seven sessions with the leader treatments were conducted in which in total nineteen 
groups of five subjects participated. In each of the seven sessions we ran both leader 
treatments, i.e. we employed a within-subject design. To control for order effects nine 
groups started with ten rounds of treatment SLC and then played ten rounds of 
treatment NLC; the sequencing was reversed for the remaining ten groups.  
 
The subjects were students from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration in Bergen. They were recruited from classes in the same period for both 
treatments. No subject had previous experience in any related experiment and none of 
them participated in more than one session. Subjects were told that they could earn 
between NOK 100 and 180 ($12.50–$22.50 at that time) in about one hour (circa 1.5 to 
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2.7 times a typical hourly wage of students in Norway). They knew that rewards were 
contingent on performance.  
 
Upon arrival subjects were randomly seated behind computers such that groups were 
formed in a random way. The computers were separated by curtains, and subjects could 
not identify the other members in their group. Instructions (in Norwegian) were 
distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. An English translation of the 
instructions of treatment SLC can be found in Appendix 2.  
 
Before the first round was played, the leaders were privately informed via the computer 
screen that they were randomly chosen as leaders in their group. In all sessions, all 
parameters of the experiment were common knowledge to all subjects including the 
asymmetry in the payoff functions between the leader and the followers in treatment 
NLC. Subjects knew from the very beginning that they would play ten rounds in the 
experiment, and then another ten rounds with a slightly different design (exact wording 
in appendix). In each round subjects had to decide how many tokens out of the en-
dowment of 20 tokens they wanted to invest in project A; the remaining number was 
automatically invested in project B. At the end of each round, subjects were informed 
about the individual decisions of the group members and their own payoff for the 
round. Information about individual decisions was provided to avoid asymmetries 
between the leader, for whom the investment had to be revealed, and the other players. 
After the last round, subjects were privately paid their earnings from all rounds. Each 
session lasted for about one hour and average earnings (including NOK 20 for showing 
up) were NOK 116.7 (≈ $15). 
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3. Results 
We first present average results over rounds. In section 3.2, we consider the 
developments of investments over rounds, and in section 3.3 we discuss our findings.        
 
3.1. Results based on average investments over rounds 
Tables 1a and 1b present for all 19 groups the average investments in the public bad 
(project A) over rounds and over group members. Sessions are labeled A through G. 4 
Within each session groups are numbered. The two tables differ with respect to 
treatment order.  
 
[Insert Tables 1a and 1b about here] 
 
The tables show that average investment levels are closer to the Nash prediction of 20 
than to the socially efficient level of zero. This indicates that in both treatments subjects 
behave on average as weak free riders, which is in line with findings in standard 
simultaneous public bad and public good experiments. 
 
The costs of leading are important for the examples set by leaders: leaders invest 
significantly less in treatment NLC than in treatment SLC. This holds both for the first 
ten rounds (10.57 versus 14.79) as well as for the last ten rounds (12.03 versus 15.90). 
According to a non-parametric two-sided Mann-Whitney U test these differences are 
statistically significant (p=0.01, n1=10, n2=9 for rounds 1-10, and p=0.03, n1=9, n2=10 
for rounds 11-20).
5
   
 
Tables 1a and 1b show that even though average leader investments are considerably 
different, followers invest on average the same in treatments SLC and NLC, namely 
                         
 11 
15.53 and 15.21 in rounds 1-10, and 17.76 and 17.10 in rounds 11-20 , respectively. 
Consequently, the null hypothesis that follower investments in the two treatments are 
equal cannot be rejected (p=0.55, n1=9, n2=10 for rounds 1-10, and p=0.24, n1=10, n2=9 
for rounds 11-20, Mann-Whitney U test).   
 
Irrespective of the costs of leadership, leaders invest significantly less in the public bad 
than followers do (p=0.001 for treatment SLC and p=0.000 for treatment NLC, n=19, 
matched-pairs signed-ranks Wilcoxon test). When taking averages over both leaders 
and followers, average group investments in the public bad are significantly lower in 
treatment NLC than in treatment SLC  (p=0.038, n=19, Wilcoxon test). Thus, on the 
aggregate level the costs of leading seem to matter. 
 
Then we turn to the question about effects of leadership institution versus effects of 
example set by leaders. Group level data may shed some light on this issue. Figure 1 
shows data points for average leader and follower investments over rounds for all 
groups in the two treatments. Symbols differ for the first and last ten rounds. First 
notice that except for three cases, all data points lie on or to the left of the line denoting 
equal leader and follower investments, i.e. in nearly all groups followers invest on 
average more than their leaders. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
To see if average follower investments vary with average leader investments we 
perform a regression on the data points in Figure 1. Pooled data for rounds 1-10 suggest 
that follower investments are not influenced by the leader investment at all; the slope 
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coefficient is not different from zero (p=0.58). When looking at pooled data for rounds 
11-20, the slope is positive and highly significant (p=0.0003). We obtain similar results 
when using separate data for treatments SLC and NLC. In the first 10 rounds both 
slopes are not different from zero (p=0.93 and p=0.76); in the last 10 rounds we find p-
values of respectively 0.0002 and 0.06. Hence, it seems that at first it is the leader 
institution and not the size of the example that matters.  
 
Figure 1 suggests that there is no big difference between the leadership effect of 
ordinary and very good examples; the effect seems to saturate. Average follower 
investments never go below a lower limit, no matter how low the average leader 
investments are. A comparison to results in Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003) 
supports this finding. Their instructed leaders invested on average much less than in the 
present experiment, namely only 3.10 tokens. They found average follower investments 
of 15.38 as compared to 15.53 in the present experiment. Only the first 10 rounds of the 
two experiments are directly comparable since the last 10 rounds followed respectively 
„no leader‟ and NLC treatments. Subjects were recruited from the same student 
population and at approximately the same time. Taken together, these data suggest that 
very strong examples may not have much more influence on followers than moderate 
examples.   
 
3.2. Results based on investments round by round 
Figures 2a and 2b show time-series for average investments over groups for leaders 
(thin lines) and followers (thick lines), for treatment orders SLC-NLC and NLC-SLC 
respectively. Both leader and follower investments tend to increase over rounds, which 
is in accordance with results from previous public good and public bad experiments 
(Ledyard 1995). 
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[Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
 
The figures demonstrate that for both treatments average leader investments are lower 
than follower investments in most cases. The gap between average leader and follower 
investments tends to be larger in the first round of a treatment (rounds 1 and 11) than in 
ensuing rounds. In particular, average first round leader investments are just above 5 in 
treatment NLC and just above 10 in treatment SLC. A closer inspection of data for 
individual players reveals that 11 out of 19 leaders set the best possible example in the 
first round of treatment NLC (by investing zero in the public bad), versus 4 out of 19 
leaders in treatment SLC.
 
At the same time, 2 (4) leaders set the worst possible 
example by investing 20 in the public bad in the first round in treatment NLC (SLC). 
 
Interestingly, leaders in treatment NLC also choose to increase investments over time 
in spite of no costs of leading. Hence, the major tendency seems to be that leaders start 
out by setting very good examples, and then adjust their investments to reduce the 
distance to the follower investments.  
 
To get more detailed results, we have run a regression analysis in which we use group-
level data for each and every round rather than the averages over groups shown in 
Figures 2a and 2b. We specify the following model for average follower investments 
F






ti txFSFSx ,6,543210, )(     (4) 
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where Ltix ,  is the leader investment in the same group. The dummy variable iS  captures 
the effect of leader costs and takes the value 1 (0) in treatment SLC (NLC). The dummy 
variable iF  represents treatment order and takes the value 1 (0) in rounds 1-10 (11-20). 
The expression in parentheses captures the effect of the example set by the leader; this 
effect is allowed to vary with the two dummy variables. Finally we capture the effect of 
round number t. When estimating the model we use robust standard errors by taking 
into account that observations are independent across groups but not necessarily within 
groups because of repeated interactions (by using the option robust cluster in Stata). 
The regression results are depicted in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
As a first observation note the typical and highly significant tendency for investments to 
increase over time (6), within 10 round periods. More importantly, the regression 
results provide additional information on the leader effect. First note that the total effect 
of the leadership institution cannot be estimated by comparing two treatments that both 
have a leader institution. However, 1 (p=0.055) measures how leader costs influence 
the effect of the institution; higher costs lead to a stronger effect. The effect of the 
leadership institution declines over time, 2 (p=0.013). The effect has the same size as 
that for leader costs. 
 
The effect of the size of the example set is captured by parameters 3, 4, and 5. In the 
case of no costs (NLC), 3 signals a positive leadership effect of 0.08; it is highly 
significant. When the leader incurs costs of leading, this effect increases from 0.08 to 
0.20 (SLC treatment); the increase 4 being statistically significant (p=0.024). The 
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effect of the example set on follower behavior is therefore stronger when the costs of 
leading are higher. Finally, the effect of the example set does not decline over time,5 is 
not significantly different from zero. Since we have assumed a linear model, the results 




The regression results suggest that leader costs both influence the effect of the 
leadership institution and the effect of the example set. This is consistent with the 
predictions of the model of inequality aversion in Appendix 1. The model shows that 
sufficiently inequality averse followers are more sensitive to the leader‟s example in 
treatment SLC than in treatment NLC. In addition, the outcome in which all followers 
invest the same amount as their leader (and less than 20) may be an equilibrium in 
treatment SLC but not in treatment NLC.  The latter prediction is also supported by 
detailed data from the experiment. When focusing on the instances in which a follower 
invests exactly the same amount as the leader in the group, it turns out that 53 of the 76 
followers follow the leader more often in treatment SLC than in NLC, whereas the 
reverse holds for only 15 followers (for the remaining 8 followers the frequencies are 
the same in both treatments).  
 
Regarding leaders, we find the expected effect of costs; lower costs lead to stronger 
examples set. Inequality aversion may explain why leaders invest at all in treatment 
NLC when it is not costly to invest zero.
 
When NLC came first (second) in a session, 
followers invested on average 15.21 (17.10). For these investment levels, inequality 
aversion implies that leaders should have invested 5.63 (11.30) in order to equalize 
payoffs between themselves and the average follower. Average leader investments in 
                         
 16 
these two cases were respectively 10.57 and 12.03. The observed investments are rather 
close to the predictions from inequality aversion although they are somewhat higher, 
particularly when NLC comes first. 
 
Another, speculative explanation why leaders would invest at all in treatment NLC  
could be that leaders try to use the level of investments as a device for punishments or 
rewards in a kind of tit-for-tat strategy. That is, leaders that start out with zero or low 
investments and later increase their contributions may do so to punish followers for 
high investments. Those that start at high values may want to find out about the 
follower contributions first and then possibly reward low contributions by reducing 
their own investments. Leaders starting at intermediate levels may want to leave both 
options open.
6
 Our data show that in NLC leaders on average tend to vary investments 
more over rounds than followers (standard deviations of respectively 7.03 and 4.83) and 
on average leaders tend to have lower positive first order autocorrelations than 
followers (respectively 0.02 and 0.29). Hence, leaders do seem to be more active in 
changing investments than followers indicating a certain desire to influence followers. 
 
In order to understand better how leaders react to follower behavior we have regressed 
leader investments in round t on several explanatory variables, such as round, treatment 
dummy and the average followers‟ investment in round t-1 (results not presented here 
but available upon request from the authors). The latter estimate turns out to be positive 
and highly significant. Similarly, if we estimate the effect of changes in follower 
investments on changes in leader investments that coefficient is also significant. The 
fact that leaders respond to higher follower investments by increasing their investments 
could also be seen as support for the use of some kind of (modified) tit-for–tat strategy.
7
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4. Conclusions 
We have investigated an issue that has been neglected in the leadership literature thus 
far, namely the question whether the costs of setting a good example have an effect on 
the investments in a public bad. The standard public bad experiment, with five subjects 
in a group making their investments decisions simultaneously was altered such that one 
person was a first mover (Moxnes and van der Heijden 2003). This person, the leader, 
was randomly selected and, by deciding first he could set a good or bad example. After 
being informed about the group leader‟s decision, four „followers‟ made their 
investment decisions simultaneously. In order to examine the effect of the cost of 
leadership, we had two treatments: in the same-leader-costs treatment (SLC) leaders 
and followers had the same costs, while in the no-leader-costs treatment (NLC) it was 
not costly for the leader to abstain from investing in the public bad, i.e. setting a good 
example was not costly for the leader. 
 
We found that randomly selected leaders tend to set good examples by investing less in 
the public bad than followers, with the best examples set for low costs. However, 
leaders do not reduce investments to zero when they have no costs of leading. Rather 
their investments seem to reflect inequality aversion, and they may also try to influence 
the group of followers by some tit-for-tat strategy. 
 
We are aware that our results should be interpreted carefully and cannot be applied 
directly to the real world. However, we think our results raise some very interesting 
questions and therefore it seems worthwhile to consider possible implications for real 
world policies. Outside of the laboratory, one normally thinks of leaders as self 
selected.
8
 Particularly high costs of pollution or low costs of abatement may be 
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motivating factors. Moral obligations and status earned by taking a lead may be other 
motivations. Simple selfishness may also suffice if the number of players is as small as 
it was in our experiment.
9
 If one takes the results of the experimental design literally, 
one could speculate that for instance the United Nations could officially designate 
leaders in different regions of the world, and expect that they rise to the challenge. 
 
Our results indicate that higher costs of leading motivate followers to invest less in the 
public bad for given examples set by leaders. Regressions over rounds show that higher 
leader costs both increase the effect of the leader institution and the effect of the size of 
the leader example.  
 
It follows from our results and previous studies that taking a leading role will provoke 
greater reductions in global environmental problems than what follows directly from 
local abatement. Side effects such as diffusion of technology and of innovative public 
policies to stimulate abatement may also help other nations increase their ambitions and 
thus strengthen the leadership effect further. Our results also show that the leadership 
effect seems to saturate; below a certain point further reductions in leader investments 
seem to have no or little effect. This finding suggests that it is probably better if two 
nations go half way in leading, rather than one going all the way. 
 
Our experiment went over 20 rounds with two consecutive leader treatments. As in all 
public bad and public good experiments the willingness to contribute towards the 
common good declines over rounds. Both average follower investments and the 
regression over rounds suggest that investments in the public bad are higher in the 
second than in the first treatment. A certain tendency for the leadership effect to decline 
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over time may be counteracted if at each stage irreversible (international) treaties are 
put in place to prevent reversals towards free riding. Once a treaty is in place, there may 
be a “restart” effect where new leadership initiatives may again have some effect. 
 
While simplified laboratory experiments should not be expected to give very precise 
predictions of real world effects of leadership, our experiment could say something 
about general underlying tendencies to cooperate, to set good examples, and to follow 
leaders (see Smith 1982, on parallelism). The results point out a potentially important 
mechanism to increase voluntary contributions and to strengthen negotiations of treaties 
to solve global environmental problems. The current experiment investigates one of the 
simplest situations in which leadership may contribute and can therefore be seen as a 
first step to get more insights in the functioning of and limits of a leadership institution. 
 
Unlike in the real world, in the experiment players are anonymous to each other, there 
is no communication (see Bohnet and Frey 1995, Isaac and Walker 1988; 1991), no 
institutions for negotiations of allowable quotas and laws determining punishment (see 
Bianco and Bates 1990 for a theoretical discussion and Ostrom et al. 1992 for empirical 
evidence), no missing or distorted information about other players, no political 
processes, no NGOs such as environmental groups and polluter organizations, and the 
only punishment option lies in hard to anticipate and interpret future investment 
decisions. Furthermore, other nations‟ awareness of the example set may be higher or 
lower than in the experiment, the costs of abatement may be higher or lower, leaders 
will not be chosen randomly, and there may be side effects such as profits from sales of 
new technologies influencing expected leader payoffs. Further studies may include field 
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studies of cases where leadership may have played a role. The effects of any of the left-
out factors could be interesting topics for much further (experimental) research.  
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Appendix 1: The Fehr-Schmidt model in a public bad game with different costs of 
leading by example 
 
The Fehr-Schmidt model assumes that the utility function of player i takes the 
following form:  



















where πi denotes the monetary payoffs of player i, the parameter i measures the utility 
loss from disadvantageous inequality (i.e. the individual's inferiority aversion) and the 
parameter i measures the utility loss from advantageous inequality (i.e. the individual's 
superiority aversion). The standard assumptions are that 0  i < 1, i  i (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999) 
 
For both treatments SLC and NLC, the inefficient equilibrium in which all group 
members invest the maximum amount in the public bad remains an equilibrium for any 
values of the inequality parameters. Rather than writing down a full-fledged equilibrium 
analysis we derive conditions on i and i for which additional, more efficient, 
equilibria can be supported. In particular we want to show that there exist situations in 
which followers follow the leader in treatment SLC but not in treatment NLC.  
 
For reasons of convenience the payoff functions for followers and leaders are repeated 










jL x1.00.12 . 
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Treatment SLC 
Given the leader‟s investment xL
A
, suppose xxx AL
A
i  i, with x<20, i.e. all group 
members invest the same, but less than the maximum in the public bad. We want to 
derive for which parameter values this can be an equilibrium in treatment SLC. With 
these investments, the individual monetary payoffs are 
xxxx AL
A
ii 2.08)3(1.02.08  i  and thus xxxU
A
ii 2.08)(  . 
If subject i deviates, he would always want to invest more (since by investing less the 
monetary payoffs decrease and utility is lost because of increased inequality). Thus 
suppose  xx Ai , with 0 .
10
 Then  2.02.08)4(1.0)(2.08  xxxi  







2.02.08)(  .   
For xxx AL
A




ii . That is 
0)15.1(2.02.03.0)3.02.02.08(2.08  iiixx  , which holds if 
and only if i ≥ 2/3.  
This means that in treatment SLC all situations in which everyone invests the same 
amount can be subgame perfect equilibria if followers are sufficiently inequality averse.  




 we derive if, and under which conditions xxx AL
A
i  i, with x<20, can be 
an equilibrium in treatment NLC. With these investments, the individual monetary 
payoffs for followers are xxxx AL
A
ii 2.08)3(1.02.08  i≠L whereas the 
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leader earns xxL 4.01241.012  . Utility for follower i is thus 
)2.04(
4
2.08)( xxxxU iAii 

. 
Suppose follower i deviates and chooses  xx Ai , with 0 . The resulting monetary 
payoffs are  2.02.08)4(1.0)(2.08  xxxi , 
 1.02.08)3(1.02.08  xxxxj  j≠i, and 















  xx ii . 
)()(  xxUxxU Aii
A


























9  iiii  . 










9  iiiii  for the 
standard assumptions 0  i < 1, i  i.  
 
This implies that an inequality averse follower i always has an incentive to deviate and 
therefore more efficient outcomes of the type xxx AL
A
i  i with x < 20 cannot be 
supported as equilibria in treatment NLC. If inequality averse leaders anticipate this 
reaction of the followers they may have an incentive to set xL
A
 >0 or even xL
A
 =20, even 
though setting the best example is not directly costly for them in this treatment.  
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Conclusion 
The analysis in this appendix illustrates that under certain conditions followers may 
choose xxx AL
A
i  i with x < 20 in treatment SLC but not in treatment NLC. In 
particular, the efficient and socially optimal level of investments xi
A
 = 0 i can only be 
an equilibrium in treatment SLC. The reason is that sufficiently inequality averse 
followers don‟t want leaders to earn more or less than themselves. Therefore, these 
followers are more likely to follow their leaders in treatment SLC. The analysis also 
demonstrates why leaders in treatment NLC may invest positive amounts rather than 
zero.  
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Appendix 2: Instructions for the experiment (not for publication) 
 
This appendix contains an English translation of the instructions for the Same-Leader-
Cost treatment (SLC). 
 
Welcome 
This is an experiment to investigate investing behaviour. The instructions are simple. If 
you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. Earnings will 
be paid in cash immediately after the experiment. In addition, you receive NOK 20 for 
showing up. The money has been supplied by the Norwegian Research Council. 
  
In the experiment you first have to make 10 investment decisions, one in each round. 
After that we will change the design slightly and there will be 10 additional decision 
rounds. The payoffs of all 20 rounds determine your total earnings. 
  
During the experiment you belong to a group together with four other subjects, which 
are the same persons all the time. Your payoffs will depend on your own decisions and 
on what the other four members of your group decide. The design is such that nobody is 
able to find out which persons belong to a group and what decisions persons have 
made. In other words, you are anonymous. 
 
Investments and payoffs 
In each round, you (and all others in your group) can invest an endowment of NOK 20. 
So, in total, NOK 100 per round is invested. You can invest in two different projects: 
project A and project B. You write down how much you want to invest in project A, the 
rest of your endowment is then automatically invested in project B. Project A yields a 
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direct payoff of NOK 0.70 per crown invested. Note, however, that in addition to the 
payoff for yourself, investing in project A yields an additional cost of NOK 0.10 per 
crown invested for you and the other four members in your group. Similarly, 
investments in project A by the other members give a cost for you and the other 
subjects. Project B yields a direct payoff of NOK 0.40 per crown invested. Investments 
in project B have no (indirect) impact on the payoffs for others. All persons in a group 
are in the same position. 
  
To make it easier to see the consequences for your payoffs of the investment decisions 
made by you and the others, we have computed the payoffs for several combinations. 
To limit the size of the table we only mention investments in steps of 5. However, you 
can use all integers from 0 up to and including 20 when you choose your investment in 
project A. 
 
An example shows how the numbers in the table are computed. Assume that you invest 
NOK 10 in project A. Then you receive a direct payoff of NOK 7 from project A. The 
rest of your endowment, NOK 10, is automatically invested in project B, and yields a 
payoff of NOK 4. Together this generates a direct payoff of NOK 11. Assume 
furthermore that the other four persons in your group invest on average NOK 5 in 
project A. That gives a total investment of NOK 20 in project A for these four persons. 
Together with your own investment of NOK 10 this gives a total investment in project 
A of NOK 30. This yields a cost of NOK 3 for you (and for the others). A direct payoff 
of NOK minus a cost of NOK 3 gives your own payoff of NOK 8. 
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   Table to calculate your own payoff per round 
Average investment 
in project A 
by others 
Your own investment 
In project A 
 0 5 10 15 20 
0 8 9 10 11 12 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
10 4 5 6 7 8 
15 2 3 4 5 6 




Before you, at your monitor you see three windows. There is one window with two 
buttons to click on, one to send your investment decision, the other one to receive 
information. You should only click on these buttons when the experimenter tells you to 
do so, in order to synchronize the game. The investments are entered in the box 
“Investment in A” in the “Decision” window. In this window you must also enter the 
number of the round, which will be called out by the experimenter in each new round. 
After you have filled in this window, it is necessary that you push the “Invest”-button 
twice. The investment decision is sent when there is a sound from your computer. The 
same sound is made when you click on “Get Information”.  
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The window “Information” shows your last investment in project A, and the payoff for 
that round. The window also shows how much the other four subjects in your group 
have invested in the previous round.  
 
In each group, one subject is selected to be the leader for all rounds to be played. Before 
the other subjects decide, they get to see the leader‟s investment in project A in the 
round. The subjects that are selected as leaders see this in the “Information” window. I 
will use the expressions “leader” and “others”.  
 
After 10 rounds we inform you about the changes in the rules for the last 10 rounds. 
 
For your own sake, and for our sake in case something goes wrong with the computer 
or the network, please fill in your investment in project A for every round at the 
enclosed form. At the end, you sign the form such that we have a receipt for the 
payoffs. Your payoffs are tax-free.  
 
Do not look at other monitors and do not communicate with any of the other 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1a: Average investments in the public bad in the leader treatments for the group 
and for leaders and followers separately. Treatment order: SLC-NLC.  
 
 
SLC (rounds 1-10) NLC (rounds 11-20)            
Group average leaders followers average leaders followers 
A1 13.20 13.30 13.18  14.66 11.90 15.35 
A2 14.28 14.00 14.35  16.90 15.00 17.38 
A3 15.38 19.20 14.43  18.44 18.00 18.55 
C1 15.50 15.63 15.47 16.88 13.13 17.81 
C2 17.88 16.25 18.28 16.50 12.50 17.50 
C3 14.88 13.75 15.16 14.75 10.00 15.94 
D1 16.14 16.00 16.18  14.70 5.50 17.00 
D2 15.84 13.50 16.43 14.18 8.50 15.60 
D3 15.36 11.50 16.33 17.76 13.70 18.78 
Average 15.38 14.79 15.53 16.09 12.03 17.10 
 
                         
 34 
Table 1b: Average investments in the public bad in the leader treatments for the group 
and for leaders and followers separately. Treatment order: NLC-SLC.  
 
 
NLC (rounds 1-10) SLC (rounds 11-20)            
group average leaders followers average leaders followers 
B1 14.08 12.50 14.48   19.30 19.90 19.15   
B2 13.26 8.80 14.38   16.30 14.00 16.88   
B3 14.12 9.00 15.40   18.50 17.00 18.88   
E1 14.66 9.70 15.90   17.10 15.70 17.45   
E2 14.10 10.00 15.13   18.30 17.50 18.50   
E3 15.80 17.00 15.50   14.92 12.00 15.65   
F1 15.38 8.80 17.03   18.50 16.50 19.00   
F2 12.50 5.50 14.25   15.00 12.00 15.75   
G1 13.74 9.00 14.93   17.62 16.60 17.88   
G2 15.20 15.40 15.15   18.30 17.80 18.43   
Average 14.28 10.57 15.21   17.38 15.90 17.76   
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Table 2: Estimation results of equation (4). Average follower investment in group i in 
round t as dependent variable. 
Variable Symbol Coeff. p-value 
Constant 0 13.87 0.000 
Effect of leader costs 1 -1.58 0.055 
Effect of first treatment 2 -1.51 0.013 
Effect of leader example 3 0.08 0.007 
Effect of leader costs on effect of leader example 4 0.12 0.024 
Effect of first treatment on effect of leader example 5 -0.03 0.439 
Effect of round number 6 0.43 0.000 
Note: R
2
=0.36, F=43.40, n=368. 
 
 














Figure 1: Data points showing average leader and corresponding follower investments 
for all groups in first ten rounds and last ten rounds, and a line for equal leader and 
follower investments. 
 




Figure 2a: Development of the average investment in the public bad across rounds for 
followers (thick lines) and leaders (thin lines). Treatment order SLC-NLC. 
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Figure 2b: Development of the average investment in the public bad across rounds for 
followers (thick lines) and leaders (thin lines). Treatment order NLC-SLC. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
*Authors‟ note: The project has been financed by the SAMRAM program of the 
Norwegian Research Council.    
1
 Some experiments have introduced other forms of asymmetry, though. For instance, 
Levati et al. (2007) have conducted a four-person public good experiment with a leader 
where two group members had a low endowment and the other two group members had 
a high endowment. Other experiments have incorporated asymmetry in two-person 
games by giving or not giving the leader private information in order to investigate the 
effects of signaling and reciprocity (see e.g. Potters et al. 2007 for a voluntary 
contributions environment and Meidinger and Villeval 2002, for a team production 
environment).  
2
 This intuition is similar to the conjecture by Brandts et al. (2007) that in order to 
overcome coordination failure in a weakest-link game the player(s) with the lowest 
effort costs should act as leader(s).  Their experimental results do not support this 
hypothesis; instead leadership is largely driven by subjects with the most common cost 
type. However, in their study all players move simultaneously such that leading by 
example within a round, as we consider, is not possible.   
3
 In contrast, some social psychological studies about leadership suggest that leaders 
may set a bad example. Findings from these experiments indicate that merely assigning 
people to a leader role may increase a leader‟s tendency to behave selfishly and to 
make self-benefiting choices at the expense of others, for instance because leaders feel 
more privileged or entitled to do so (e.g., Samuelson and Allison 1994, De Cremer and 
Van Dijk, 2005). This would imply for our setting that leaders would invest a lot in the 
public bad, and probably more than followers. 
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4
 Different from the computerized sessions, in session C we used a rather time 
consuming manual procedure, receiving and passing out information on slips of paper. 
To save time each treatment consisted of only eight rounds in this session. Otherwise 
the setting was the same as in the computerized sessions (including the room). It is 
sometimes argued that contact between subjects and experimenters could influence the 
experimental results (Hoffman et al. 1994). However, as we find no significant 
differences between the manual and computerized sessions, like Bolton et al. (1998) 
and Weimann (1994) we pool all data.  
5
 Unless indicated otherwise, all tests are two-sided and based on (strictly independent) 
group level observations. 
6
 In our experiment leaders can only punish collectively, and they can only do so by 
increasing their investment in the public bad. It would be an interesting extension for 
future experiments to see what leaders would do if they could punish individual 
followers like in Fehr and Gächter (2000). 
7
 This raises the question who influences who, i.e. could it also be that a good example 
set by a follower works as good for the other followers as a good example set by the 
leader? We think this is not the case. First, as mentioned in the introduction, several 
experimental studies have documented a positive effect of leadership. Furthermore, 
Moxnes and Van der Heijden (2003) find no evidence that group member follow 
followers, even though some followers show very cooperative behavior. In addition, 
Rivas and Sutter (2008) report that if in a public goods game leaders contribute after 
the other group members the average group contribution is similar to that in a public 
good game without a leader. This suggests that a good example by a „visible‟ leader 
works better. 
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8
 In reality, leaders are often elected rather than randomly chosen, and this could affect 
the results. In a public good experiment, Güth et al. (2007) find that leaders that are 
selected by the group behave similarly as appointed leaders. In addition, there are no 
significant differences between average contributions to the public good when groups 
have an elected or appointed leader. Rivas and Sutter (2008), on the other hand, find 
that endogenous leadership is much more efficient than exogenously imposed 
leadership.   
9
 In the SLC treatment average payoffs for leaders were slightly lower (4.75) than for 
followers (4.97). However, average leader payoffs were slightly higher than obtained in 
a comparable experiment with no leader (4.50), Moxnes and Van der Heijden (2003). 
10
 Actually, because the utility function is piecewise linear, if someone deviates he 
would always want to deviate to the maximum, i.e. xi
A
 = 20. To simplify the analysis 
we examine the more general case here. 
 
 
 
 
